uses the political economy of war to explain patterns of civil war emergence in the former Yugoslavia. He argues that it was shaped above all by patterns of illicit trade in weapons and other goods.20 By emphasizing the role of primary commodities, resource curse theory offers one interpretation of the political economy approach.
The evidence linking primary commodities to war is suggestive, but much remains to be conceptualized. Politics should be priviledged over economic determinism, because resources are unlikely to trigger civil war in a stable political environment. Once war is underway, varying legal and physical configurations of natural resources will have different impacts on the course and style of the war. These concerns can be addressed through a detailed study of Congo-Brazzaville's wars.
Congo-Brazzaville's Civil Wars: An Overview
Denis Sassou-Nguesso's single party regime ruled Congo-Brazzaville from 1979 to 1992. Sassou ran the country as a neopatrimonial rentier state, redistributing oil profits to allies and potential foes through educational benefits, military employment, and an ever-expanding civil service.21 In the 1980s Sassou kept the system stable by incorporating elites from the country's three main ethnoregional groupings: the northern Mbochis, the central Laris, and the southern grouping of several distinct ethnicities referred to by some as Niboleks.22 The president and senior army leadership were northern in origin, but southern elites held some positions of responsibility in the government, civil service, and army and benefited from the government's massive investment in public education.
Democratization and Conflict
Sassou's regime came under fire in the early 1990s, following francophone Africa's wave of post-cold-war democratization. Political pressure from southern elites, labor parties, intellectuals, and French officials forced Sassou to relinquish his hold on power. The country held multiparty presidential elections in 1992, sparking competition for the apex of Congo's patronclient pyramid and giving southern elites a legally sanctioned chance to control the country's oil wealth.23 Sassou's two main opponents were Pascal Lissouba, who had served as prime minister in 1963, and Bernard Kolelas, a Brazzaville politician. Lissouba led the Pan-African Union for Social Democracy (UPADS), support for which came from the southern provinces, and won the 1992 elections due to the region's demographic superiority.24 Kolelas, head of the Congolese Movement for Democracy and Integral Development (MCDDI), was presidential runner-up, relying chiefly on his Lari ethnic kin, a subgroup of the Bakongo ethnicity comprising 20 percent of the population.25 Sassou-Nguesso, leader of the formerly Communist Congolese Labor Party (PCT), polled a distant third, largely due to the inferior demographic weight of his northern Mbochi kin.26 Lissouba assumed the presidency in 1992 and briefly ruled with a parliamentary coalition with Sassou's PCT. Sassou abruptly left the government, however, when his followers were denied key posts in Lissouba's new government. Cabinet ministries were key sources of oil rents and patronage, and Sassou feared that he and his followers were being pushed aside.
As Lissouba struggled to assert control, it became clear that possession of Congo's presidential palace did not guarantee ownership over Sassou's former networks of allies, patrons, and clients. Lissouba had won the vote, but some senior Mbochi army officers remained loyal to Sassou. Sassou also enjoyed warm relations with foreign allies, such as France's prime minister, Jacques Chirac, Gabon president Omar Bongo (married to Sassou's daughter), and Angolan president Eduardo Dos Santos. 27 Distrustful of the army and worried by Sassou's defection, Lissouba created a personal militia to bolster his rule. Relying mostly on men drawn from southern ethnicities, Lissouba established an independent security force, the reserve presidentielle, later known as the Aubevillois.28 Its initial military trainers, among others, were members of private Israeli security firms.29 Lissouba's supporters later created three other forces, the Cocoyes, loosely translated as "tough guys," the Zoulous, whose name was inspired by the ongoing violence in Kwazulu-Natal, and the Mambas (snakes). Congo's democratization had disrupted the ancien regime's patronage networks, but Lissouba, the newly elected leader, was unable to create a stable alternative. His failure generated an acute sense of political uncertainty whose ripple effects were felt throughout Congo's governing class. The country's petroleum fields continued to pump out 200,000 barrels a month, however, earning $75 million monthly in export revenue for those who claimed legal control over the government. The first round of fighting ended in January 1994, but the stage had been set for further conflict, as the armed forces, parliament, and civil service gradually split along ethnoregional and factional lines. By 1996-97 three main militia groups-Lissouba's Cocoyes, Kolelas' Ninjas, and Sassou's Cobras-had created their own zones of de facto influence in the capital city. 
An Empirical Puzzle
Congo-Brazzaville's experiences recall other cases of state collapse in which rapid political transitions, coupled with ethnic heterogeneity and abundant resources, sparked civil war. Unlike Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Angola, however, Congo's conflict did not deteriorate into protracted territorial warfare by warlords and/or separatists. All three Brazzaville-based militias recruited rural youth, and each of the three main political parties organized along regionally defined "ethno-parties."43 Still, the first two rounds of fighting occurred exclusively in the capital, while in the third southern militias did not take lasting control of any city (though several were briefly conquered and looted) and did not attempt to seize Pointe-Noire, the petroleum industry's administrative nerve center. Nor did they carve out warlord fiefdoms in Congo's remote areas. Instead, southern military and political leaders quickly surrendered in return for amnesty, reintegration into their former public sector jobs, and vague promises of recruiting the militias' rank-andfile members into Congo-Brazzaville's reconstituted security forces.
For theorists of ethnic warfare, the lack of protracted rural fighting is puzzling because of the ethnic heterogeneity of Congo's three main ethnoregions. For theorists of the resource curse, the south's quick surrender is intriguing because Congo's oil is located directly off southern shores and could have formed the base for southern seces-sionism. Congo also confounds Reno's prediction that neopatrimonial, resource-rich countries are likely to deteriorate into warlord zones as an "equilibrium outcome" situated halfway between chaos and state consolidation, as both rebels and governments develop some territorial control but lack incentives to build broadly encompassing state institutions. 44 -controlled N'Kossa field (70,000 barrels a day) , have their own offshore terminals. Pointe-Noire, in other words, is not physically crucial to Congo's oil industry, since its administrative functions could be easily handled elsewhere.
Only the most technologically sophisticated international companies can extract Congo's oil. The N'Kossa field is located thirty-eight miles off shore in 600 feet of water, while other fields are a further twelve miles away under 3,000 to 6,000 feet. Petrol is loaded directly onto tankers from offshore terminals, eliminating the need for pipelines. Armed nonstate groups, therefore, have virtually no access. Piratestyle raids on the platforms themselves or on tankers are the only alternative, but neither are particularly feasible. Furthermore, even if they could damage oil extraction infrastructure, rebels could not operate the platforms on their own. Congo's oil wealth, in others words, is physically inaccessible to local armed factions.
Oil is also Congo's economic lifeline, accounting for 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings, 40 percent of GDP, and 70 percent of government revenues.51 Congolese access to oil profits is possible only due to the international legal regime, which awards sovereignty rights to offshore mineral resources. Had oil been a precious commodity during the colonial era, Europeans would have seized it without compensation. Today, western companies are the only actors physically able to extract the oil, but they must also pay rents to Congo's sovereign rulers.
Oil rents come in various forms. The most important include royalties on sales by western companies, which amount to 12 percent of Congo's overall export value, and a 1991 agreement awarding the state half of the oil companies' profits, equal to 19 percent of export value.52 A third source of rents comes from sales made directly by the state-owned SNPC. This company's accounts are not transparent, however, and its profits are a crucial tool in Congo's presidential patronage system. According to observers, SNPC monies are a hidden slush fund that Congo's internationally recognized ruler uses to purchase arms for his private militia, pay off friends and potential rivals, and keep the country's neopatrimonial system afloat. The SNPC is a vehicle for "looting" Congo's oil but is available only to the country's internationally recognized sovereigns.
The Importance of Brazzaville
Following Congo's democratic transition, Lissouba failed to demonstrate credible control over Brazzaville due to poor relations with the army's senior ranks, paramilitary mobilization by all three contenders, and lukewarm relations with important foreign actors. His rivals carved out militia zones in the capital, and both Kolelas and Sassou fought sharp battles with Lissouba loyalists in the city. The fighting, however, remained centered in the city, since it was the only prize worth having. Until 1997 the core of the three main militia groupings had military or quasi-military origins. However, the rank and file was composed mostly of unemployed or underemployed young men, few of whom had a chance of working in the stable, publicly owned formal sector. These youths were recruited by Sassou, Lissouba, or Kolelas loyalists at different times from 1993 to 1997.61 At first, the politico-military elites used these young men to wage their factional struggles, chiefly in Brazzaville. Most of the militiamen who were interviewed, whether on the side of Sassou's regime or the opposition, declared having received at least part of their weapons from higher-ranking military officers. Le Japonais, a former stall owner and gang leader before the war, said that his Cocoye band received its weapons from the military. "One evening," he recalled, "our brother, who was a military commander, brought us fifteen AK47s." In 1997 "a colonel came and gave us weapons and asked us to fight with them. He paid CFAFr 15,000 per week."62 According to the Commissaire, the Ninja band leader, "Commandant Camille, who had been in jail with Kolelas, recruited youth for the Ninjas."63 For elites, militias were political instruments, but for the rank and file, conflict was an opportunity for small-scale looting, hence the propensity of militiamen to rob people of their own ethnic background, including their own political leaders.
The Return of Neopatrimonial Logic
As the violence progressed during 1998-99, elite-militia class differences led to diverging political agendas. For the elites, the most pressing concern was to end the war and return to Brazzaville, as they grew fearful of their militia "followers," who seemed increasingly uncontrollable. The elites hoped to build a support base among ordinary southerners, but they were being looted and intimidated by the militias. In the words of Colonel Bougouanza, one of the highest-ranking military officers in the southern rebel movement: "Idle youth is like a bomb. When kids go to war, it is to improve their material existence, which reduced our chances of success in the war."64 Whereas militiamen recall the war with nostalgia, the elites speak of 1998-99 in terms of fear and hardship.
Others The interaction between primary commodities and domestic politics thus seems crucial. If a country has a stable political system, authoritarian or otherwise, it is unlikely to experience civil war, regardless of resource availability and distribution. During the 1980s, while Sassou-Nguesso remained firmly in control of the country, Congo-Brazzaville did not experience civil war; once democratization dislodged Sassou's grip in the early 1990s, however, resource-related wars broke out. In this respect, the experiences of Botswana, Gabon, and Cameroon are instructive counterexamples. Despite abundant reserves of accessible diamonds (far more "lootable" than Congo's petroleum), long democratic Botswana has not only avoided civil war but has been quite successful at building institutions.73 Cameroon and Gabon, too, have proved more peaceful than Congo-Brazzaville, although they share similar political and economic structures, because their leaders negotiated democratization in the early 1990s with greater skill and stability than Sassou in Congo. 74 No matter how tempting natural resources might be and how they may exacerbate ongoing instability and armed conflict, they are unlikely to stimulate civil war on their own unless the political context is already unstable.
This finding has important implications for promoters of democracy in Africa and elsewhere and grimly illustrates the potential risks involved. Like Sassou's Congo, many authoritarian systems are based on neopatrimonial structures that rely on personalized, deinstitutionalized power machineries. Electoral change and sudden elite turnover do not present newly elected leaders with a neutral state apparatus, but rather saddle them with biased and uncooperative networks. Reshaping and controlling these networks, as Congo-Brazzaville's Lissouba attempted to do in the early 1990s, may trigger militia formation and resistance by fearful or excluded elites and, consequently, spiraling security dilemmas. Democratization does not inevitably lead to violence, but it can certainly be provocative, especially when lucrative natural resources are involved.
A second implication of Congo is that the legal, physical, and geographic specificities of natural resources are crucial. When resources are physically accessible and geographically dispersed, protracted and territorialized conflicts may occur, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo-Kinshasa), where rival armies have carved out warlord enclaves based on widely dispersed subsoil minerals. If, by contrast, resources are physically accessed only with great difficulty by technologically sophisticated mining companies, wars will be temporally and spatially limited. Revenues accrue then to recognized sovereigns through mining company royalties, not through physical access itself. Political actors thus try to control the sovereign apparatus in the capital city, rather than peripheral territories. Warring parties, moreover, may be more readily willing to collaborate with whatever party establishes credible, long-term control over the capital city. Angola's protracted civil war was an important counterexample. The country has substantial offshore oil resources, but its diamond deposits are easily accessible in outlying regions, which made protracted territorial war possible. 75 Congo also suggests that prospects for civil war termination are better when the conflict is preceded by a reasonably inclusive neopatrimonial system. Although the 1990s were bloody, Congo's legacy of peaceful elite participation in Sassou's regime in the 1980s made it possible, once Sassou reconquered the capital, for opposition elites to imagine cooperating once again under his rule. Sierra Leone presents an interesting counterexample: prior to the civil war in the 1990s, presidents Stevens and Momoh used diamond revenues to build exclusionary, self-serving "shadow" structures of power, rather than inclusive neopatrimonial systems.76 When civil war erupted, rival groups readily resorted to territorialized warfare. Neopatrimonialism
